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PRIVATE LAW
PERSONS
Katherine Shaw Spaht*
JURISPRUDENTIAL DOCTRINE OF RECRIMINATION
The long established jurisprudential doctrine of recrimi-
nation1 was again invoked in two recent courts of appeal
decisions to deny the parties a separation from bed and
board.2 Historically, the doctrine of recrimination was bor-
rowed from the common law and rests on the equitable prin-
ciple that "he who comes into equity must come with clean
hands .... -"3 Repeatedly, the Louisiana Supreme Court has
held that when the husband and wife are both at fault,
neither party can obtain a separation or divorce. 4 Before this
doctrine can be invoked, there must be a finding that the
* Associate Professor of Law, Louisiana State University. In this issue
there appears a student note which discusses two recent cases expanding the
rights accorded to putative spouses, King v. Cancienne, 316 So. 2d 366 (La.
1975) and Cortes v. Fleming, 307 So. 2d 611 (La. 1973).
1. Eals v. Swan, 221 La. 329, 59 So. 2d 409 (1952); Snell v. Aucoin, 158 La.
767, 104 So. 709 (1925); Amy v. Berard, 49 La. Ann. 897, 22 So. 48 (1897);
Castanedo v. Fortier, 34 La. Ann. 135 (1882); Trowbridge v. Carlin, 12 La.
Ann. 882 (1857); Durand v. Her Husband, 4 Mart. (O.S.) 174 (1816).
2. Schillaci v. Schillaci, 310 So. 2d 179 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1975); Maranto v.
Maranto, 297 So. 2d 704 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1974).
3. 27 C.J.S. Divorce § 67, 225-28 (1959): "As a general rule .... divorce is a
remedy for the ... innocent against the guilty.... If both parties are equally
at fault, a divorce will not be granted." The doctrine of recrimination rests on
the concept that he who seeks redress for the violation of a contract resting
on mutual and dependent covenants must himself have performed the obliga-
tions on his part.
4. E.g., Eals v. Swan, 221 La. 329, 59 So. 2d 409 (1952).
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fault of both parties is of the same character and of equal
proportions. 5
In Maranto v. Maranto6 the wife sued the husband for a
separation from bed and board on the grounds of cruel treat-
ment and abandonment. 7 The husband reconvened, seeking a
separation on the basis of the wife's cruel treatment and
abandonment. The court found that both parties had been at
fault s in the deterioration of their thirty-year-old marriage,
which incidentally had produced ten children. 9 Since neither
party was less at fault than the other, the court dismissed
their claims. In Schillaci v. Schillaci' ° the wife filed a petition
for separation against her husband on the basis of his cruel
treatment and abandonment. The husband, in turn, recon-
vened for a separation on the ground of cruel treatment.
Unquestionably, each party had committed serious marital
wrongs towards the other during their twenty-three years of
marriage." The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal affirmed the
5. Id.; Armentor v. Gondron, 184 La. 922, 168 So. 102 (1936); Ducros v.
Ducros, 156 La. 1033, 101 So. 407 (1924); Duhon v. Duhon, 110 La. 240, 34 So.
428 (1903).
6. 297 So. 2d 704 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1974).
7. LA. CIV. CODE art. 138.
8. Maranto v. Maranto, 297 So. 2d 704, 705 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1974). Four
years prior to the parties' separation the husband choked the wife, his reason
being that his wife refused to have sexual relations with him. After that
occasion the wife continued to refuse to have sexual relations with her
husband and shared a bedroom with one of the ten children. The wife stated
that the husband constantly accused her in front of others of being mentally
ill. A second incident of alleged physical cruelty by the husband occurred
when the husband pinched the wife on the toe and she responded by calling
him a bastard. Thereafter, each party struck the other and a pushing contest
ensued.
9. Id. at 706. "We are of the opinion that had either party to this litiga-
tion relented in the wrongs claimed by the other, that their marriage would
not have deteriorated to the point of no return. In essence, we find mutual
fault." Unquestionably, the husband had been guilty of cruel treatment to-
wards the wife. The most serious cruel treatment was his accusations of the
wife's mental illness. Apparently, the majority of the court felt that the wife,
too, had been guilty of cruel treatment towards the husband, evidenced by
her repeated refusal to engage in sexual intercourse. The court cited
Phillpott v. Phillpott, 285 So. 2d 570 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1973) which was noted
by this author in The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1973-1974
Term--Persons, 35 LA. L. REV. 259 (1975). The author of the dissenting
opinion in Maranto agreed with the trial court, which had granted the wife
the separation. Because there was a factual basis for the trial court's
findings, the dissenting judge felt there was no manifest error.
10. 310 So. 2d 179 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1975).
11. Id..-at 180.
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trial court's dismissal of both claims on the basis of recrimi-
nation.
Paradoxically, when the doctrine of recrimination is
properly invoked, the result is that two individuals who have
demonstrated their inability to live together must suffer sub-
sequent indignities before the "knot" can be legally "untied."
The result of applying the doctrine of recrimination is both
unrealistic and unsupported by the legislation.12 As long as
the judiciary continues to invoke this doctrine, further jus-
tification exists for the writer's suggestion concerning no-
fault separation-that either spouse be permitted to obtain a
separation on the basis of living separate and apart for thirty
days. 13 This would eliminate the unseemliness of a public trial
in which the parties hurl accusations and recriminations at
one another. More importantly, when a marriage has dete-
riorated such that the spouses' common life is intolerable, 1 4
judicial relief could be obtained by either party without the
frustration caused by an equitable but unrealistic doctrine.15
ALIMONY AFTER DIVORCE
As early as 1950 the Louisiana Supreme Court in Smith v.
Smith'6 considered the requirement found in Louisiana Civil
Code article 16017 that the wife be without "sufficient means
12. LA. CIV. CODE arts. 151-53; R. PASCAL, LOUISIANA FAMILY LAW
COURSE 122 (1974): "The exception of mutuality of fault may be reasonable
enough if the degree of seriousness of fault is about the same, even if not of
the same kind, as long as the common life is not intolerable for the spouses"
(emphasis added).
13. The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1978-1974 Term-
Persons, 35 LA. L. REV. 259, 265 (1975); The Work of the Louisiana Appellate
Courts for the 1972-1978 Term-Persons, 34 LA. L. REV. 201, 203-04 (1974).
14. In both Schillaci and Maranto the courts of appeal recognized that
the respective marriages of the spouses had deteriorated. In Schillaci, the
court cited the trial judge's opinion that the marriage had disintegrated to a
point where each party was enjoying the hostilities demonstrated towards
the other. In Maranto, the court found that "had either party to this litiga-
tion relented in the wrongs claimed by the other. . . . their marriage would
not have deteriorated to the point of no return" (emphasis added).
15. R. PASCAL, LOUISIANA FAMILY LAW COURSE 122 (1974): "It [doctrine
of recrimination] has no role, and is not invoked, in suits for separation based
on living separate and apart by mutual agreement for one year or for divorce
founded on living separate and apart for two years."
16. 217 La. 646, 47 So. 2d 32 (1950).
17. Prior to the 1964 amendment to LA. CIV. CODE art. 160, it read in
part: "If the wife who obtained the divorce has not sufficient means for her
maintenance, the Court may allow her in its discretion . . .alimony . .
(emphasis added).
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for her maintenance" to be eligible for alimony after a di-
vorce. The court interpreted the language to mean sufficient
property, including, capital assets, 18 to provide primarily food,
shelter and clothing.19 By virtue of a partition of the commu-
nity property, the wife's assets, valued at approximately
$20,000, consisted of seven United States Government War
Bonds, a 1948 Pontiac automobile, and the balance in notes of
her husband bearing interest at 2% per annum. In answer to
the question " 'Can a wife who is in possession of property
and assets valued at $20,000 be said to be without sufficient
means for her maintenance?' "20 the court responded nega-
tively. The more difficult question, "[t]o what extent should
the wife be required to exhaust her capital before seeking
alimony," was purposely left unanswered by the court.2 1
In 1973 the Louisiana Supreme Court again elaborated on
the meaning of "maintenance": 22
Common sense dictates that the term "maintenance,"
while meaning primarily food, clothing and shelter, does
include such items as reasonable and necessary transpor-
The 1964 amendment to LA. CIV. CODE art. 160 changed in some respects
the text of the article, which in part provides: "When the wife has not been at
fault, and she has not sufficient means for her support, the court may allow
her ... alimony . . ." (emphasis added). The pertinent portion of article 160
differs little in content before and after 1964. In Smith the court recognized
that a distinction exists between alimony pending suit for separation and
divorce under LA. CIV. CODE art. 148 and alimony awarded to the wife after
divorce under article 160. Prior to 1964 both article 148 and article 160 used
the word "maintenance"; and presumably, the amendment to article 160
substituting the word "support" for "maintenance" was to legislatively recog-
nize the jurisprudential distinction.
18. This interpretation of the word "means" was essentially to distin-
guish it from the word "income" in LA. CIV. CODE art. 148.
19. Smith v. Smith, 217 La. 646, 654, 47 So. 2d 32, 35 (1950). According to
the court, "It is not to be inferred ... that the wife must be practically
destitute before she can act. In fact the language of article 160 implies the
opposite because it expressly stipulates that it is in case she has not sufficient
means that she can apply for the alimony from which it follows that she may
have some means." Id.
20. Id.
21. Id.: "How far she should go in depleting her capital presents another
question. Whilst we do not think that she should be made to use it all, on the
other hand, we do not believe that the law intends that she can maintain it
'intact .... To what extent the wife should be made to use up her capital
before applying for the alimony is a matter with which we are not concerned
at this moment."
22. In 1973, LA. CIV. CODE art. 160 no longer contained the word
,'maintenance"; the word "support" had been substituted.
[Vol. 36
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tation or automobile expenses, medical and drug ex-
penses, utilities, household expenses, and the income tax
liability generated by the alimony payments made to the
former wife. 23
Thus, in recognition that modern-day expenses generally con-
sidered necessary have increased, the court liberally re-
defined "maintenance."
Subsequently, the majority of the Louisiana Supreme
Court in Frederic v. Frederic24 introduced a new element into
the determination of whether a divorced wife has "sufficient
means for her support" under Article 160-liquidity of her
assets. In Frederic the estimated net value of the community
property, which had not been partitioned, was $188,900. With-
out proving that her interest was insufficient for her support,
the wife claimed that until the community property was par-
titioned and liquidated she had no "practical" means for her
support.25 Between the dates suit was filed and arguments
were heard, the wife had received a check in the amount of
$20,700, representing one-half of the sale price of part of the
community immovables. According to the court, "This
amount [$20,700] was liquid and is available for her sup-
port. ' 26 By relying on Smith yet making allowances for the
difference in money values, 27 the court denied the wife post-
23. Bernhardt v. Bernhardt, 283 So. 2d 226, 229 (La. 1973). The Court of
Appeal for the First Circuit took an interesting approach in applying the new
definition of "maintenance" in article 160 to the facts of Hughes v. Hughes,
303 So. 2d 766 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1974). Examining a list of the wife's expenses,
the court accepted as valid those that could be fit into various categories such
as reasonable and necessary transportation or automobile expenses, medical
and drug expenses, utilities, household expenses, and income tax liability.
The court in Hughes awarded the wife alimony in the sum of $1,500 per month
based upon her proven expenses and the husband's ability to pay.
In Mendoza v. Mendoza, 310 So. 2d 154, 157 n.4 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1975) the
Court of Appeal for the Fourth Circuit noted in a footnote: "In calculating an
appropriate amount for maintenance, we included the amounts submitted for
payments on the house, gas, electricity, water, telephone and maintenance of
an automobile and medical bills. We did not include the amounts submitted
for yard maintenance, medical insurance, automobile insurance, house in-
surance and charitable contributions."
24. 302 So. 2d 903 (La. 1974).
25. The court was no doubt impressed with evidence that the wife's
intractability had been the major reason partition of the community property
had not yet been accomplished. Id. at 906.
26. Id.
27. "Making allowances for the differences in money values, the similar-
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divorce alimony. Although the court did not give definitive
reasons, it mentioned the wife's undivided interest in prop-
erty valued in excess of $73,000, in addition to $20,700 cash.
Hence, it presented a stronger case for denying post-divorce
alimony than Smith. Justice Tate28 disagreed in certain re-
spects with the holding of the majority: "'Until the estate is
partitioned and Mrs. Frederic is placed in possession of liquid,
liquidable or income-producing property she has no practical
means for her support and is entitled in that respect to Arti-
cle 160 alimony.' "29 Nonetheless, he admitted that a "closer
question is presented" once the wife had received the $20,700
check.30
After a careful reading of Frederic, one might reasonably
conclude that the first step in determining whether a wife is
without "sufficient means for her support" is to separate her
liquid from nonliquid assets. The First Circuit Court of Ap-
peal utilized this approach in Webster v. Webster 31 and Bryant
v. Bryant.3 2 In Webster the wife had received in the commu-
nity property settlement $4,850 cash (reduced by the time of
the trial to $3,300), matured bonds valued at $650 and an
unencumbered house worth $9,500. 3 In addition, she had
earned $150 per month for nine months of the year. According
to the court, her liquid assets, the cash and matured bonds,
had to be depleted to provide the wife food and clothing before
she would be entitled to alimony. 34 In Bryant the wife had a
ity of the issue in Smith v. Smith to the instant case is notable. Moreover, the
facts in the Smith case are not as strong for denying alimony as are the facts
in the case at bar. In the Smith case the wife had no liquid assets, only
property ...." Id. at 907.
28. Justice Tate concurred in part of the majority opinion and dissented
in part. "As to the disallowance of post-divorce alimony, I particularly dissent
from the holding that the wife had no right to alimony because she owned an
interest in indivision in assets of the former community, a large part of which
is a stock interest in a corporation controlled by the husband. I would there-
fore affirm the initial award of post-alimony." Id. at 908.
29. Id. at 909. See the court of appeal decision in the same case, 295 So. 2d
52 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1974).
30. 302 So. 2d 903, 909 (La. 1974).
31. 308 So. 2d 302 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1975).
32. 310 So. 2d 648 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1975).
33. The net value of the wife's assets at the time of trial was $12,800.
34. "We see no reason why she should not be required to deplete the
liquid assets she received in the settlement to provide her own food and
clothing .... The house has provided for the wife's shelter; and the liquid
assets, until they are all consumed, should be used to provide her food and
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monthly income of $222. The total value of the community
property, consisting of thrift funds, annuity funds, equity in
the house, rental property, and a savings account was
$47,000; the wife also owned land in Mississippi worth approx-
imately $1,650. 35 Because the thrift and annuity funds could
not be enjoyed by either the husband or wife until the hus-
band reached retirement age, the court valued the wife's
property at a little over $15,000. Citing Smith and Frederic,
the court determined that the wife had demonstrated in-
sufficient means for her support. Particularly in comparison
to Smith, the court assumed the relevancy of the nature of
the wife's assets:36
If the nature of the property, such as its liquidity, is
relevant to a determination of its availability to the
wife's maintenance, then it is significant that between
the Smith case and our present facts there are other
notable differences. In Smith, the $20,000 worth of assets
consisted largely of U.S. Government war bonds and
notes due the wife by the husband, which are not so
distant from being liquid assets, whereas in the facts of
the case before us, the conversion of the property into
liquid assets would require the sale of the family home,
and the resulting additional expense . . .37
In addition to distinguishing the liquidity of assets in Smith
and Bryant, the court considered as most significant the "dif-
ference in money values in the quarter century that sepa-
rates the two cases. 38
Frederic and its progeny contain a much needed reap-
clothing. This, of course, does not prevent her from petitioning the court at a
later date when her liquid assets have been depleted or upon some other
change of circumstances, but until such occurs, she has sufficient means for
her own support" (emphasis added). 308 So. 2d 302, 308 (La. App. 1st Cir.
1975).
35. Bryant v. Bryant, 310 So. 2d 648, 650 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1975).
36. Id. "Smith was decided in 1950; Frederick [sic], in 1974. In comparing
the two fact situations, Frederick [sic] recognized the necessity for 'making
allowances for the differences in money values.' Another difference between
the facts, noted the court, was that Frederick [sic] involved $20,700 in liquid
assets while in Smith the wife possessed $20,000 worth of property only, no
liquid assets. This made Frederick [sic] the stronger case for denying
alimony."
37. Id. (emphasis added).
38. Id. at 651.
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praisal of Smith, in light of twenty-five years of economic
recession and inflation. In Bryant, as in Frederic, the courts
in applying Smith realistically considered the difference in
value of assets worth $20,000 in 1950 and assets worth essen-
tially $15,000 in 1975. This realistic and flexible approach to
the application of Smith was long overdue, particularly since
post-divorce alimony is supposedly a mere "gratuity in the
nature of a pension. ' 39
The relevancy of the liquidity of the wife's assets may
create problems. Difficulty exists in determining whether or
not a particular asset is liquid. In Smith, according to the
court in Bryant, the U.S. Government war bonds and notes
due the wife by the husband were "not so distant from being
liquid assets. '40 The matured bonds which the wife received
in Webster in the community property settlement were con-
sidered liquid assets. Of course, cash and checks should be
considered liquid assets.41 In contrast, the thrift and annuity
funds in Bryant, which neither wife nor husband could enjoy
until his retirement, were considered nonliquid assets. No
determination has yet been made concerning the liquidity of
such items as deposits in a savings account, 42 unmatured
certificates of deposit, stocks and bonds, and tangible prop-
erty (automobiles, furniture).43
Furthermore, in addition to the difficulty in separating
liquid from nonliquid assets, the court in Webster would re-
quire the wife to entirely deplete her liquid assets before
claiming alimony.44 Presumably, before the assets are de-
39. Frederic v. Frederic, 302 So. 2d 903, 906 (La. 1974); Bryant v. Bryant,
310 So. 2d 648, 649 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1975). See also Hays v. Hays, 240 La. 708,
124 So. 2d 917 (1960); Brown v. Harris, 225 La. 320, 72 So. 2d 746 (1954).
40. Bryant v. Bryant, 310 So. 2d 648, 650 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1975).
41. Id. Frederic v. Frederic, 302 So. 2d 903 (La. 1974); Webster v. Webster,
308 So. 2d 302 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1975).
42. See Bryant v. Bryant, 310 So. 2d 648, 650 n.1 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1975):
"In her tax return for 1973 Mrs. Bryant reported interest income of $112 for
that year from savings accounts. She was questioned about this at the trial
and while the record is not entirely clear in this regard, it would appear that
neither the interest nor the principal in these accounts actually belonged to
her .... Counsel for the husband was apparently satisfied with Mrs. Bryant's
explanation of this item, because he did not pursue it further."
43. With respect to immovable property, the court made the following
statement: "[I]n the facts of the case before us, the conversion of the property
into liquid assets would require the sale of the family home, and the resulting
additional expense. . ." (emphasis added).. Id. at 650.
44. Webster v. Webster, 308 So. 2d 302, 308 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1975).
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pleted, the wife could retain counsel to file a motion or peti-
tion seeking alimony, so that the depletion of her liquid assets
would coincide with the judicial hearing. Careful planning by
the wife and her attorney is obviously necessary. The ques-
tion still remains to what extent the wife will be required to
deplete those assets considered nonliquid before she will be
entitled to alimony. Webster simply states that she may apply
to the court for alimony once her liquid assets have been
consumed. In Smith the wife in possession of $20,000 worth of
capital assets (at that time liquidity of the assets was not an
issue) was considered as possessing sufficient means for her
maintenance. Would the wife in Frederic, under the language
contained in Webster, be entitled to alimony after exhaustion
of the $20,700 check, even though her interest in the commu-
nity property exceeded $73,000? Presumably not.45 The ques-
tion unanswered in Smith remains: "To what extent should
the wife be required to exhaust her capital before seeking
alimony?" 48
DUAL STATUS
In Warren v. Richard,47 the Louisiana Supreme Court
held that a child may recover for the wrongful death48 of its
biological father to the exclusion of the decedent's legitimate
father and mother, even though the child is presumed under
state law to be the legitimate issue of another man.4 9 The
45. The court itself in Frederic considered the wife's interest in the
community as well as the $20,700 check in deciding that the wife had
sufficient means for her maintenance. Frederic v. Frederic, 302 So. 2d 903,
906 (La. 1974).
46. See quotation in note 21, supra; Smith v. Smith, 217 La. 646, 655-56, 47
So. 2d 32, 35 (1950).
47. 296 So. 2d 813 (La. 1974).
48. The action for wrongful death is created by LA. CIV. CODE art. 2315,
which reads in part: "The right to recover all other damages caused by an
offense or quasi offense, if the injured person dies, shall survive for a period
of one year from the death of the deceased in favor of: (1) the surviving
spouse and child or children of the deceased, or either such spouse or such
child or children; (2) the surviving father and mother of the deceased, or
either of them, if he left no spouse or child surviving; and (3) the surviving
brothers and sisters of the deceased, or any of them, if he left no spouse,
child, or parent surviving. The survivors in whose favor this right of action
survives may also recover the damages which they sustained through the
wrongful death of the deceased."
49. A presumption of paternity is established by LA. CIV. CODE article
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court concluded that, at least with respect to the wrongful
death statute,50 such a child occupies a dual status, legitimate
in relation to the husband of the mother and illegitimate in
relation to the biological father. An explicit result of the hold-
ing in Warren is that a child enjoying dual status may recover
for the wrongful deaths of both its legitimate and its biologi-
cal fathers. 51
Two cases-recently decided by the courts of appeal illus-
trate problems of dual status raised by Warren. In Succession
of Mitchell,52 the First Circuit Court of Appeal held that a
child presumed to be the legitimate issue of another man
cannot be legitimated by the subsequent marriage of its
biological father to its mother. The dubious point of distinc-
tion from Warren is that Mitchell deals with the right of
inheritance rather than with the right to recover under the
wrongful death statute. 53 In Dugas v. Henson,54 the Third
Circuit Court of Appeal held that a husband presumed to be
the father of the child cannot disavow the child on the ground
that he is the legitimated child of another.5 5 No mention of
Warren was made in the opinion. The Louisiana Supreme
Court has granted certiorari in Mitchell56 and denied it in
Dugas.57
184: "The law considers the husband of the mother as the father of all
children conceived during the marriage."
50. The court cited Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968), and Glona v.
American Guarantee & Liability Ins. Co., 391 U.S. 73 (1968), as controlling.
Both cases dealt with the state's excluding illegitimate children from the
benefits of the wrongful death statute, a practice held to be in violation of the
equal protection clause.
51. "The argument rightly assumes that there is no question that the
child may recover for the wrongful death of her legitimate father." Warren v.
Richard, 296 So. 2d 813, 815 (La. 1974).
52. 312 So. 2d 130 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1975), cert. granted, 314 So. 2d 735
(1975).
53. The court relied on Labine v. Vincent, 401 U.S. 532 (1971), which
upheld Louisiana succession laws that are strongly discriminatory against
illegitimates.
54. 307 So. 2d 650 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 310 So. 2d 851
(1975).
55. The court was overbroad in its statement of the law, in light of
Warren: "This court has heretofore held that a child who is presumed to be
the legitimate child of the mother's husband under LSA C.C. Art. 184 cannot
also be the legitimated child under LSA C.C. Art. 198 of the actual father and
mother by their subsequent marriage." 307 So. 2d 650, 654 (La. App. 3d Cir.
1975).
56. 314 So. 2d 735 (1975).
57. 310 So. 2d 851 (1975). Justice Barham dissented from the refusal of
(Vol. 36
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Despite the subsequent decisions of the courts of appeal
distinguishing Warren, the Louisiana Supreme Court's recog-
nition of dual status is of potentially far-reaching effect, since
restricting its result to the wrongful death statute is logical-
ly, if not legally, impossible. The writer believes that both the
reasoning and the result are wrong in Warren, but a thorough
critique of the case is impossible in a report of this nature.
Furthermore, it appears to this writer that the court in War-
ren plunged into a legal thicket in which it is destined to
wander for some time before emerging. In the course of this
adventure, the seamless garment of the Code is likely to suf-
fer some rents and tears.
writs of certiorari: "Also it was conclusively proved that the child is the
biological child of Henson, who is not the husband of the mother of the child.
The child is the legitimate child of Henson." Id.
